Stuey Ungar v Mansour Matloubi

By Philip Tuck

12 September 2007

When looking at these types of 'miracle' plays don't just shake your head and wonder how they do it - get out there and analyse the play

Back in 1990 former WSOP main event winners Stuey Ungar and Mansour Matloubi played heads-up for $50k. In their battle one of the most amazing hands of all time came up...

One of the greatest no limit holdem hands ever played had to be the infamous call made by Stuey ‘the kid’ Ungar against the 1990 WSOP main event winner Mansour Matloubi.

After his infamous exit from the 1990 WSOP (Ungar overdosed on cocaine the night before the third day - incredibly he had enough chips to still cash for $20,050 without playing another hand), Stu was keen to show that he should have won the tournament and challenged the eventual winner, Mansour Matloubi, to a $50,000 heads-up freezeout to re-establish his reputation.

The match had started in Mansour’s favour, although prior to this hand Ungar had forced Mansour to fold a few big hands. The blinds were $250/$500 and stacks stood at $40,000 for Mansour Matloubi and $60,000 for Stu Ungar when the following hand came up.

Ungar raised to $1,600 in the small blind. Matloubi called with 4-5 off suit.

The flop came 3-3-7 rainbow.

Matloubi checked, Ungar bet out $6,000 and Matloubi called.

The turn came a king and both players checked.

The river was a Queen and Matloubi bet all of his remaining chips (around $32,000). Ungar called within a matter of seconds after declaring that Matloubi must have either 5-6 or 4-5 and flipped over 9-10 - winning an $80,000 pot with 10-high.

This hand really shows how the many elements involved in NL holdem can come together and allow a skilled player to make what looks like an impossible call. This article will attempt to show what was probably going through Ungar’s mind during this hand - and how the reader can apply these thought processes to their own games.

The pre-flop action is relatively unimportant in the context of the rest of the hand - both players are capable of raising and calling in a heads-up game with a hand range that probably includes all pairs, all connectors (whether suited or off suit), all high cards, and any suited hand.

Stu has 9-10, a nice high connected hand, well worth a raise. Matloubi had 4-5 off suit, again a good, well disguised hand to be playing into a pre-flop raise - no problem calling here with such large stacks behind (if Ungar had only $10,000 left this is an easy fold due to the lack of any implied odds).

The flop bet is where some of the key information of the hand is gained for Ungar. Matloubi check calls a bet that is nearly double the pot ($6,000 into a pot of $3,200). This is an extremely clever bet from Ungar after Matloubi’s check. By raising such a large amount Ungar is effectively forcing Matloubi to give up vital information about where he stands.

Matloubi calls - this gives a wealth of information about his hand. Firstly it is likely he does not have a seven. Top pair is a powerful holding heads-up, Matloubi is astute enough to put in a decent bet or check raise here with a seven. Secondly he has no draw of any power - there is no flush draw and no possible open ended; the only draws out there are all gutshot straight draws (4-5, 5-6, or 6-4). Thirdly it is unlikely he just has over cards or a naked ace - $6,000 is a decent chunk of Matloubi’s stack to throw in with just over cards.

The final possibility is Matloubi is holding a 3 and the call-indicates a trap. This is a definite possibility, but it may have been only at the back of Ungar’s mind for a simple reason.

Matloubi is an aggressive and loose player who would probably raise here with a 3 in an attempt to disguise it (strange as it sounds loose, aggressive players have to strongly bet their good hands to give their constant bluffs credibility - a point Ungar is well aware of).

As the 3 is still a possibility Ungar probably checks behind on the turn in an attempt to regulate the pot size and to try and gain some more information on the river. If Matloubi has a 3 he will have to bet it at some point. The importance of position is clearly shown here - Matloubi has to give some idea of his hand to Ungar before he decides what to do.

It is worth noting that the Q is probably a blank card as far as Ungar is concerned - the possibility of Matloubi holding over cards is minimal and it fills no draws.

Now the monster bet on the river. As far as Matloubi’s bet is concerned this is actually a good play - he thinks Stu is weak (he is right), and he wants to stop Stu having the ability to re-raise him as he himself is weak (again, good thinking). He makes a play which would probably work against 99% of players and goes all-in.

The problem for Matloubi is this bet actually fills in the final pieces of the puzzle to Ungar. Now the possibility of the 3 is very low - over shoving for $32,000 into a pot of $15,200 would be an extremely odd move with trip 3s (a value bet would both force Stu to fold or re-raise if he had nothing, or extract extra chips if Ungar had a 7, but the shove achieves neither of these goals).

By removing trips from the equation the problem becomes much simpler. If we take the previous information we can now rule out any pair below 7s (shoving it in here with that type of hand is just plain suicidal), any pair of 7s or above (if he has a pair over 7s but under Queens he would usually be content to check/call the hand down as the pot is big already), and if he has trip Queens, Kings, or a pair of Aces he will nearly always bet for value in case Stu has a bit of the board.

Ungar’s thoughts at this point must be running over what hand calls on the flop then shoves the river that is not a pair or trips. There is only one other group of hands that warrants a flat call on the flop - the gutshot straight draw. And the only combinations of gutshot are all beaten by Ungar at this point (6-5, 5-4, or 6-3). These hands also explain the over shove on the river (Ungar himself regularly used the over shove to stop weak players bluffing his own weakness in big pots).

The puzzle is now complete: Ungar even analyses this hand so deeply he correctly observes that Matloubi does not have 6-3 (probably viewing this hand as too weak to call the pre-flop raise) announces that he must have 5-4 or 6-5, quickly calls, and the hand and the match are won.

When looking at these types of ‘miracle’ plays don’t just shake your head and wonder how they do it - get out there and analyse the play. This hand is not magic - it is cold hard analysis by arguably the greatest poker player who ever graced the felt. If it wasn’t for Ungar’s unquenchable thirst for cocaine he would probably be making plays like this today.